An injurer undertakes precautions to reduce both the probability and the severity of an accident. The damages that the victim suffers are privately observed, and will be verified at a cost if the case is litigated. While finely tuned damage awards induce the injurer to take appropriate precautions ex ante, they increase the probability that the litigants will disagree about the case, and thereby aggravate the settlement process. Flat damage awards reduce the level of costly litigation, but lead to underinvestment in precautions. We show that when the litigation costs are small the optimal award is finely tuned to the actual damages, and when litigation costs are large the optimal award is a flat penalty. Applications to scheduled damages and workers' compensation are discussed.
Introduction
While deterrence has been the primary focus in economic analyses of optimal damage awards, administrative and procedural issues are often at the center of the debate over legal reform. Since the court dockets are overflowing with lawsuits, all else equal, litigants should be encouraged to resolve their disputes privately through out-of-court settlement. This article explores an inherent tension between the social objectives of ex ante deterrence and ex post administrative efficiency. Although finely tuned awards may provide individuals with strong incentives to take appropriate actions ex ante, they may also increase the probability that the litigants will disagree about the case, and thereby aggravate the dispute resolution process. If the costs of litigation are large, then a simple flat award may outperform a fineIy tuned 0ne.l In the formal model, the injurer undertakes (unobservable) precautions to reduce both the probability and the severity of an accident. The damages that the victim suffers from an accident (if one occurs) are privately observed by the victim prior to the trial and are verified at a cost if the case is litigated rather than settled. We show that the optimal damage award necessarily takes one of two forms: it is either "finely tuned," equal to the victim's actual damage level, or "flat," equal to the victim's expected damage level.' If the court's policy is to base the award upon the victim's actual damages, then in equilibrium the injurer will undertake a desirable level of precautions, but victims with high damages will reject settlement offers and go to trial. The flat damage award reduces the costs of litigation by encouraging cases to settle out of court, but generates underinvestment in precautions. The trade-off is clear: when litigation costs are small, then an award based upon the actual damages is preferred; when litigation costs are large, the flat award is preferred.
One of several applications of this trade-off is the "scheduling" of damages, or standardizing awards for injuries that fall into particular categories.3 Although this is the typical method of assessing damages for personal injuries and death in Great Britain (Munkman, 1985) , judges and juries in the United States are not typically bound by rigid schedules. An interesting exception in the United States is the separation of employer responsibility for job-related injuries from the law of torts. Under state and federal workers' compensation laws, an injured employee is entitled to prompt coverage of medical expenses and a proportion of lost wages under a fixed schedule, while waiving the right to sue the employer for full damages (Darling-Hammond and Kniesner, 1980) . For example, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act includes very specific guidelines for determining damages for death, the loss of a limb, e t~.Legal scholars have suggested that scheduled damages be applied more widely, especially because the huge variability in jury awards aggravates the settlement process (Bovbjerg et al., 1989; Blumstein et al., 1991) .5
Previous theoretical studies of legal complexity and the accuracy of damage assessment have largely ignored the settlement process. Rather, they have emphasized the cost to individuals of learning more about the harmfulness of their actions, and the cost of learning information ex post to implement the more complicated rule (Kaplow, 1991; Kaplow and Shavell, 1993, 1994) .6 In our context, the cost of complexity is endogenous: the litigants have the 2. These awards also include adjustments for litigation costs.
3. An application in the criminal context are the federal sentencing guidelines that seek to achieve uniformity in sentencing by limiting judicial discretion (United States Sentencing Commision, 1990: llA1.2).
4. An important purpose of this act is to "minimize the need for litigation as a means of providing compensation for injured workmen" (33 U.S.C.A. $901 note 7 (1986)). 5. The p r i m q motivation behind no-fault accident insurance is also the saving of administrative costs (Carroll et al., 1991: 2) .
6. Among other things, Kaplow and Shavell (1993) consider the incentives of litigants to establish their information in court (at a cost), and show that private incentive to reveal information tends to be too large. In our framework, it is shown that when the costs of litigation are sufticiently large, the private incentive to litigate under a regime that bases the damage aware on the actual level of harm tends to be too large. The court can remedy this by making awards flat. opportunity to completely avoid the costs of litigation through settlement bargaining.7 However, information asymmetries when combined with legal complexity present an obstacle to efficient dispute resolution.8
This article is not the first to consider the impact of settlement on deterrence. P'ng (1987) explores the impact of strategic settlement negotiations on ex ante behavior under the negligence rule. Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988) analyze the social desirability of settlement under a strict liability rule, weighing both deterrence properties and administrative costs. While Polinsky and Che (1991) derive optimal awards, they abstract from strategic settlement issues and focus instead on the plaintiff's incentive to bring suit.9 Here, we explore the relationship between legal complexity and asymmetric information between the litigants prior to the trial, and design optimal damage awards for the court.
The following section presents the formal model and its assumptions. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium of the pretrial negotiation game. Section 4 characterizes the penalties that maximize social welfare. Concluding remarks follow.
The Model
There are two players: an injurer and a victim. The injurer may take precautions (or exert effort) to reduce the probability and severity of an accident: el denotes the level of precautions taken to reduce the probability of an accident, and e, denotes the level of precautions taken to reduce the accident's severity.lo Both e, and e, are constrained to be nonnegative.ll The injurer's cost of 7. Unlike in the previous literature, the litigation costs are not assumed to be larger for finely tuned awards. If settlements were impossible in our framework, then finely tuned awards would always be prefel~ed to flat awards.
8. Similar issues are explored in a contractual framework by Spier (1992b) . Incompleteness in the contractual framework is analogous to flat damage awards in the tort framework.
9. In Polinsky and Che's model, holding the plaintiff's award fixed, as the plaintiff's litigation cost rises, his incentive to bring suit falls. Although this has adverse consequences for deterrence, raising the defendant's liability can align the private and social incentives to sue. Here, when the cost of litigation is sufficiently large, tying the award to the actual level of harm induces too large an incentive to litigate. Flattening the awards structure aligns the private and social incentives to settle.
10. Anti-lock brakes in automobiles, for example, may serve to reduce the likelihood of an accident. Airbags, on the other hand, serve to reduce the severity of the harm, conditional upon an accident occurring. In a factory, workplace rules may create a safer environment where accidents are less likely to occur, while certain safety devices on the machines (off switches, for example) may reduce the average level of harm in the event of a mishap.
11. This specification is related to Holmstrom and Milgrom's (1991) analysis of multitask principal-agent problems, and to Shavell's (1987) analysis where the injurer chooses an activity level and a level of care to reduce the damages of an accident. Similar results would be obtained in Shavell's framework.
An alternative specification would consider a single effort decision that simultaneously influences the likelihood and severity of an accident. In such a model, a flat award could induce the socially optimal level of effort. However, if the marginal impact of effort on the probability of an accident is extremely small, then the optimal flat award would have to be extremely large in order Set(lernen1 Bargaining and the Design of Damage Avmrds 87 taking these precautions is a differentiable function C(eI,e2), and we let Ci(el,e2) denote the partial derivative with respect to e,. We assume that Ci(el,e2) is strictly positive for all el and e2 (so the injurer incurs greater costs when he takes more precautions) and that C,(O,e,) and C2(e,,0) are finite. Although the levels of precautions are known to the injurer and possibly the victim, they are not verifiable in a court of law.I2 Consequently, we do not consider negligence rules where the award may be conditioned directly upon the injurer's precautions.13 We do allow the award to be sensitive to the victim's damages, which serves as a signal of the injurer's care.
The accident may be mild, causing a low level of harm x, > 0 to the victim, or severe, causing a high level of harm x, >x,. The probability of an accident, n(eI) E (0,1], is differentiable and decreasing in el. A higher level of Type 1 precautions reduces the probability of an accident but cannot eliminate the possibility entirely. If an accident occurs, the conditional probability that the accident is mild is denoted pL(e2) and the conditional probability that it is severe is denoted pH(e2), where pL(e2) +p,(e,) = 1. These functions are differentiable and satisfy p:(e, ) > 0 and p;Xe2) = -pi(eJ < 0. In other words, a higher level of Type 2 precautions corresponds to a lower conditional probability of a severe accident, and a higher conditional probability of a mild accident. Finally, for technical reasons, we assume that ~' ( 0 ) = p;XO) = -m.l4 The first-best outcome cannot be obtained in this model through a flat damage award because such a rule would not induce the injurer to undertake severity-reducing precautions, e2.15 The "best" flat award would lead to underinvestment in e, while inducing a more appropriate level of el.
Although occurrence of an accident is assumed to be observable to both the victim and the injurer, the level of harm is not. The victim privately observes her damages, x E {xL,xH}, while the injurer must rely on his prior beliefs (which are conditioned upon his effort level). The court is assumed to be able to observe and verify both the occurrence of an accident and the level of damages; however, use of the court is costly for the litigants.
to encourage efficient precaution taking. If the injurer has limited wealth, then efficiency would be unattainable with a Rat damage award and a finely tuned damage award would be valuable. This alternative specification would yield similar results to those presented here.
12. In our context, it does not matter whether the victim observes the injurer's precautions or not. As will be apparent later, the victim's decision to accept a settlement offer depends only on his damages and not upon the injurer's precautions.
13. Cooter (1984 Cooter ( , 1991 has afgued that negligence rules are undesirable when it is costly to evaluate precautions in a court of law. It is in this spirit that we focus on strict liability rules.
Nevertheless, the insights developed here are readily applicable to negligence regimes. If the injurer has private information about his level of care, then awards that are based upon his care level are more likely to lead to costly disputes. 14. This, combined with the boundedness of C,(e,,e,), i = 1, 2, is sufficient to guarantee an interior solution for e, and e , .
15. The best Rat award is based on the expected damages of the accident, conditioned upon the court's beliefs about the injurer's precautions. Since the injurer's actual precautions are not observed by the court, a flat damage award cannot provide incentives for reducing the severity of an accident.
After an accident has occurred, the players attempt to resolve their dispute privately through an out-of-court settlement. The negotiations are assumed to take a simple form: the injurer makes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer, s, to the victim. If the offer is accepted, then the game ends; if it is rejected, then the case proceeds to trial.16 The court verifies the precise value of the victim's harm, and enforces a transfer or award from the injurer to the victim.17 Since the award may be contingent upon the severity of the accident, we denote the award structure (dL,dH), where dL corresponds to the award when damages are low, xL, and dH corresponds to the award when damages are high, xH.ls To simplify the exposition, we maintain the assumption throughout that d, 5 d,.I9 Finally, the injurer's private cost of litigation is denoted k,, and the victim's cost is denoted kV2o The sum of these private costs is given by k. 21 The court's problem is to choose an award structure (dL,dH) to maximize social welfare, or equivalently to minimize the social cost (which includes the dangers from the accident, litigation costs, and costs of taking precautions).22 To construct the optimal awards, we will work backwards. Taking (dL,dH) and the effort levels as given, Section 3 characterizes the outcome of the pretrial bargaining game. It is shown that whenever dL < dH, if the costs of litigation are sufficiently small, then there is a separating outcome: the low types settle out of court and the high types go to trial. If the costs are sufficiently large, then a pooling outcome results, in which both types settle. In Section 4 we partition the set of all award structures into two categories: those that ultimately lead to separation in the pretrial bargaining game, and those that lead 16. This timing and informational structure are similar to Bebchuk (1984) . Allowing the informed player (the victim) to make a final offer introduces signaling elements (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986) and their associated multiple equilibria. A more complicated model with offers and counteroffers would lead to the same bias in the types of cases that proceed to court. See Spier (1992a) and the surveys of Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) and Kennan and Wilson (1993) .
17. We do not allow the court to dismiss cases at random while applying a multiplier to the damage award for litigated cases. Nor do we allow direct-revelation mechanisms where the litigants are punished if their announcements conflict.
18. A more general specification would allow the victim's damages to be a continuous variable. Then the court would choose a function mapping the victim's actual damage level into an award. Given the structure of the bargaining game, there will be a cutoff where victims with low damages will accept offers and those with high damages will reject offers and litigate. An optimal award structure would induce more settlement than one that fully reflects the victim's damages; in other words, the lower tail of the award distribution would be flatter.
19. This is without loss of generality, for d, < d, would never be optimal.
20. The careful reader will notice that we have abstracted from the victim's incentive to bring suit. Assuming that x, -k, 2 0 is sufficient to assure that the victim would never want to drop a case prior to trial.
21. The analysis abst~acts from the subsidized nature of the court; in reality, there are other costs of maintaining a court system that are not borne by the litigants.
22. The court in our model represents a social planner who is interested in maximizing the welfare of society. In reality, damage schedules are often established by legislatures or govemment agencies rather than by courts. Nothing in the model would change if the court were interpreted more broadly to include these other bodies. to pooling. We then characterize the most preferred award structure within each set. A comparison of the two gives the main result.
Pretrial Negotiation
Imagine that an accident has occurred and that the victim and injurer are negotiating a settlement in the shadow of a trial. Given the award structure, (d,,d,), we can represent the victim as one of two "types," dH or d,, corresponding to her private information about the court's award. Given a settlement offer, s, rationality dictates that the victim of type di will accept if and only if s 2 di -kv-that is, if the settlement offer is greater than the amount the victim will receive in court minus her litigation costs.23 It is easy to verify that only two settlement offers are possible in equilibrium: dH -kv or dLk, . To see this, imagine that s > dH -k, . Since both types of victim strictly prefer to accept the offer than go to trial, the injurer's payoff is higher when the offer is slightly reduced. If s E (dL -kv, dH -k,), the low-damage type strictly prefers to accept the offer (while the high-damage type prefers to reject the offer and go to trial), and the injurer could certainly increase his payoff by lowering his offer slightly. If s < dL -kv, neither type accepts. By choosing s = d, -kv, the injurer induces the low type of victim to accept the offer and saves his own litigation cost, kl, with probability pL(e2). The injurer's choice of s depends upon dL and dH, as well as upon his subjective beliefs about the victim's type, which are conditional upon his own effort level: pH(e2) and pL(e2). If the injurer sets s = dH -kv, both types of victim accept and the injurer's payoff is simply -dH + k, . If s = dL -k, , the low type accepts and the high type opts for a trial, giving the injurer an expected payoff of -pL(e2)(dL -kv) -pH(e2)(dH+ k,). Comparing these payoffs, we may easily characterize the optimal strategy for the injurer.
When the litigation costs, k = k, + k, , are small, the injurer prefers to offer dL -kv, and therefore Iitigates the case when damages are high. When the costs are small, the benefit to the injurer from discriminating between the two types of victim exceeds the cost. When the litigation costs are sufficiently large, however, the injurer prefers to offer d, -kv and settle with both types of victim. The equilibrium of the pretrial bargaining game is summarized in the following lemma: Lemma I. Given an award structure (dL,dH) and an effort level e,, two types of equilibria can occur following an accident: (e2)](dH-dJ, then the equilibrium is separating. The injurer offers s = dL -kv, the low type of victim accepts the offer, and the high type rejects it and goes to trial.
(ii) If kI + kv 3 [pL(e,)lpH(e2)](dH -dJ, then the equilibrium is pooling.
The injurer offers s = dH -kv and both types of victim accept the offer. 23 . When s = d, -k,, the victim is actually indifferent. We adopt the convention that when indifferent, the victim accepts the offer.
Optimal Damage Awards
The injurer's strategy may be represented by the vector (e,,e2,s); the injurer chooses precaution levels and a settlement offer to be made in the event of an accident.z4 The result from the previous section allows us to divide the set of all award structures, (dL,dH), into two categories: those that ultimately lead to separating outcomes in the pretrial bargaining game, and those that ultimately lead to pooling outcomes. Let Ds(k) denote the former set (the subscript indicates "separating") and let D,(k) denote the latter set (the subscript indicates "pooling").25
The social cost associated with any element of Ds(k) is When the accident is mild, the case settles out of court and the social cost includes the damage caused by the accident and the cost of precautions. When the accident is severe, the case is litigated and the litigation costs k, and kv are also included in the social cost. The effort levels that minimize the expected social cost, which we denote by (@,e,*), must satisfy the first-order conditions:
Generally speaking, the precautions chosen by the injurer would not correspond to those that a social planner would choose. If (dL,dH) E Ds(k), then the injurer's optimal strategy must specify a low settlement offer (s = dLk, ) and precaution levels el and e2 ,that solve the following minimization problem:
When the accident is mild, the case settles out of court for s = dL -kv and no costs are incurred; when the accident is severe, the case fails to settle and the injurer incurs cost k,. The first-order conditions for this program are given by26 Note that these conditions do not generally correspond with those for the social optimum given in (1) and (2). However, if the award structure specifies a simple markup over the victim's harm, (dL,dH) = (xL + kv,xH + kv), and if this award structure leads to a separating outcome, (xL + kV,xH + kV) E Ds(k), then Equations (4) and (5) are equivalent to Equations (1) and (2). With this carefully chosen award structure, the injurer's choice of e, and e2 will correspond precisely with the levels that minimize the expected social cost, (G,e$)(that is, for the class of structures that lead to separating outcomes).
Setting the award equal to a simple markup over the victim's ham-i forces the injurer to fully internalize the externality generated by his actions.
Finally we can easily verify that no other award structure (dL,dH) E Ds(k)
will lead the injurer to choose 6 and e$. Equations (2) and (5) imply that xLd, = xH -dH (since pi(e,*) = -p;Xeq)), and setting Equations (1) and (4) equal gives us that d, = x, + kv and dL = xL + k, .
Lemma 2. If the award structure (dL,dH) = (xL + kv,xH + kv) leads to a separating outcome-that is, (xL + kV,xH+ kv) E D,(k)-then this award structure is strictly preferred to any other structure in the set Ds(k).
Within the class of damage awards that lead to separation in the pretrial bargaining game, the best structure (from a social perspective) specifies a simple markup of kv over the victim's actual damages. Note that this is equivalent to awarding actual damages with an English rule for allocating legal costs (since the victim always "wins"). However, this result is sensitive to the assumption that the defendant has all of the bargaining power. If the victim had some bargaining power, too, then the injurer would settle out of court for a greater amount. With more equal bargaining power, the optimal awards would tend to be scaled downward.
The following lemma characterizes the (weakly) preferred award structure among those that lead to pooling outcomes in the pretrial bargaining game. Two features are apparent. First, the damage award is flat, or insensitive to the victim's actual damages. The intuition is straightforward: any penalty structure (dL,dH) E Dp(k) is equivalent to a flat penalty structure that specifies dH be paid regardless of the true damages-that is, (dH,dH). Second, the award will lead to underinvestment in accident severity-reducing activities: e, = 0. The reason is clear: if the injurer is determined to make an offer corresponding to high damages, then there is no incentive for him to take care to reduce the expected damages. The optimal flat award will specify an award equal to the expected harm from an accident, conditional upon an accident occurring and e2 = 0, plus the victim's litigation costs.
Lemma 3. An award structure that specifies a flat damage payment, dH = dL = pL(0)xL + pH(0)xH+ k,,, regardless of the accident's actual severity is weakly preferred to any other award structure that leads to pooling in the pretrial bargaining game, (dL,dH) E D,(k).27
Proof. First, for any (dL,dH) E Dp(k), the settlement offer, s, must equal dH -k, . Second, any award structure belonging to the set D,(k) will lead the defendant to choose e, = 0. Suppose not: e, > 0; by reducing e, and leaving the settlement offer, s = dH -kv, unchanged, the injurer increases his payoff. . Under the flat award in Lemma 3, the injurer has no incentive to raise e, . If he did, his expected payments (conditional upon an accident occumng) would be the same. Therefore the best flat award must presume that the injurer takes no precautions, a presumption that is fulfilled in equilibrium.
Given the previous lemmas, we now state our main result:
Propositiorz. There exists > 0 such that when the total litigation costs exceed this value, k, + k,, r k, the court can do no better than specify a flat award structure, dH = d, = pL(0)xL+ pH(0)xHf kv, that is insensitive to the victim's actual damages, and all cases settle out of court. When the litigation costs are below this value, k, + kv < 5, the unique optimal award structure is based upon the victim's actual damages, (dL,dH) = (xL + kv,xH + kv), and the case proceeds to trial if and only if x = ~~.~8
Proof. Define I ? by 27. This flat award is not strictly preferred in the class D,(k); on the contrary, an award structure with dH = pL(0)xL + pH(0)xH+ kv and d,, -dL sufficiently small will be observationally equivalent. 28. In order to implement the optimal flat damage award characterized in the proposition, the court needs information about the distribution of damages. This suggests that scheduled damages may be easier to implement when the court (or relevant social planner) has prior experience with the type of case (as is probabIy true for workers' compensation). However, even absent extensive experience, the court may be able to obtain an estimate of the harm through a brief trial or investigation, making ex ante commitment to damage awards unnecessary. For example, rather than trying to place an exact dollar value on an individual's back injury, the court might restrict attention to evaluating the h a m caused to typical victims in similar circumstances. Expert witnesses who specialize in back injuries may be more likely to agree on the value of the latter than the former, reducing the degree of asymmetric information.
It is easy to verify that k is uniquely defined since the right-hand side of (6) is constant and the left-hand side is strictly increasing in k. To see this, imagine a small decrease in k Holding el and e, constant, the left-hand side clearly falls. Since the injurer optimizes over el and e2, the value of the lefthand side may fall even further. Also, is strictly positive since we know that e$ > 0. (This follows from the assumptions that n(el) is bounded away from 0 and pxO) = -w.)
When k1 + kv 2 k, the right-hand side (which represents the social cost of the best flat award) is smaller than the social cost of a finely tuned award (assuming that the accurate award leads to separation in the bargaining game).
However, by Lemma 2, when k, + kv 2 k, the flat award outperforms any element of Ds(k). Therefore a flat award is adopted when k1 + kv 2 k.
It remains to be shown that when k, + kv < k, the finely tuned award outperforms the flat award. It is sufficient to show that if k, +kv <k,then (x, + kV,xH+ kv) E Ds(k). To do this, we will first show that there exists a I; such that if k, + kv 2 k, then the finely tuned award leads to a pooling outcome, and if k1 + kv < k then the finely tuned award leads to a separating outcome. Second, we will show that < k, which will establish the result.
Define a separating strategy to be one with s = dL -kv, and a pooling strategy to be one with s = dH -kv. Under the award structure (x, + kV,xH+ k,), the best separating strategy that the defendant could adopt minimizes Expression (3). The best pooling strategy minimizes n(el)xH + C(e,,e2) and, as before, it is clear that e2 = 0. Let 1be defined as the litigation cost that makes the defendant indifferent between the best separating and the best pooling strategies: = Min n(el)xH + C(el,O).
el
The right-hand side of (7) exceeds the right-hand side of (6) since xH > p,(O)x, + pH(OhH.The left-hand sides of (6) and (7) are identical when = k.
Since the left-hand side of (7) is monotonically increasing in I;, we conclude that k > 1.
The general intuition for this result is straightforward: although flat awards provide poor incentives for the injurer to take precautions to reduce the severity of an accident, they are desirable in that they minimize the administrative costs. While awards that are sensitive to the true level of damages lead to more disagreement during settlement negotiations (and hence to greater administrative costs), they provide better incentives for care. When the administrative and litigation costs are small, awards that are based on the true level of damages outperform flat awards, while if the costs are large then the reverse is true.
Conclusion
Although characterization of the optimal awards derived here may be sensitive to the particular assumptions of the model, the result that a finely tuned awards structure is preferred when the litigation costs are small is robust to generalizations on the distribution of damages and the sequence of offers in the pretrial bargaining game. It is clear that when the costs of litigation are very small, then awarding true damages will force the injurer to bear costs that are close to the actual damages suffered by the victim. In the extreme case where litigation costs are zero, the settlement outcome will be accurate and awarding true damages induces the appropriate levels of severity-reducing activities. However, when the litigation costs are large, then the costs of disagreement will outweigh these beneficial incentives. Generally speaking, finely tuned rules combined with asymmetric information present an obstacle in the settlement process, and force greater resources to be expended. Although simple flat awards reduce the level of costly litigation, they may not induce a desirable level of ex ante precaution-taking by the injurer.
